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Bringing Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity into
the Tax Classroom
Anthony C. Infanti
Over the past few years, the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) has
undertaken several empirical studies on the law school climate for lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students. In a report that recently appeared
in the Journal of Legal Education,1 several members of LSAC’s subcommittee on
LGBT issues analyzed the data produced by these studies. The subcommittee
members reported that, despite improvement in the past decade, LGBT
students “still encounter[] substantial discrimination on law school campuses
and in law school classrooms.”2 Indeed, “[n]early a quarter of [LGBT]
respondents to the study reported that they had witnessed or experienced
discrimination in law school because of their sexual orientation or identity.”3
As a result, many LGBT law students “feel disenfranchised from their broader
law school communities,” causing them to “not feel safe ‘coming out’ on law
school campuses” and to “go back into the closet in law school.”4
In an appendix of “best practices,” the subcommittee members included
a myriad of suggestions for improving the law school climate for LGBT
students. Among them is a recommendation to cover LGBT issues in non–
LGBT classes:5
Inclusion of such issues is important for several reasons: (1) it serves an
important expressive value because it signals the integration and value of
[LGBT] perspectives by all faculty; (2) it helps validate [LGBT] experiences
and makes [LGBT] persons visible in the classroom and larger community;
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and (3) it is relevant to the professional goals of many [LGBT] students who
came to law school to advocate in this area.6

For these and other reasons,7 I include coverage of sexual‑orientation‑related
issues in my tax courses, especially in my basic income tax and estate and gift
tax courses.
Interestingly, I experience some of the same trepidation in raising LGBT
issues in these decidedly non‑LGBT courses that many of the surveyed LGBT
students reported.8 In the generally conservative environment of law school,
I always have some concern about how students will receive the discussion.
Given that I am open about being gay, will they tap into negative stereotypes
and think that I am proselytizing? Will my credibility as a teacher be
undermined in their eyes? Will the discussion remain respectful and will I be
able to manage it appropriately? Will students complain to the administration
that my class is too “political” or will my end‑of‑semester student evaluations
be negatively affected?
For the most part, my fears were groundless. Bringing sexual orientation
into the classroom has generally proved to be exciting, as I watch many of
my heterosexual students’ eyes open wide when they become conscious of
the practical, everyday impact of sexual‑orientation‑based discrimination on
lesbians and gay men. For my lesbian and gay students, I hope that these
discussions serve the expressive and validating functions described by the
LSAC subcommittee members in the text quoted above.
To achieve these results, I find it important to keep sexual‑orientation‑based
discrimination from being perceived as an abstract impact on some “other”
person whom the students do not know and with whom they have no
connection. To establish the personal connection that helps students empathize
with lesbians and gay men as they face a hostile tax system,9 I use narrative to
frame the discussion. Sometimes the narrative is my own, other times it is the
6.

Id. at 223.
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Among the other reasons is an attempt to integrate my research and teaching interests. See,
e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 763 (2004). In keeping with this aim, it is worth noting that I also raise other critical
perspectives in classroom discussions (e.g., those based on race, gender, and class), and
I have been working on a critical tax reader with Bridget Crawford that can be used as a
classroom supplement to provide a perspective on tax that is absent from most tax textbooks.
See Critical Tax Theory: An Introduction (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds.,
Cambridge University Press, New York, forthcoming, 2009).
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Only 43.8% of respondents reported that they were “very comfortable” discussing LGBT
issues in class. Strader et al., supra note 1, at 225. The reports of a strong majority of the
respondents ranged from “somewhat comfortable” (28.9%) to “comfortable in some cases,
but not others” (14.6%) to “somewhat uncomfortable” (11%) to “very uncomfortable” (1.7%)
discussing LGBT issues in class. Id.
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For an explanation of why I characterize the tax system as hostile to LGBT persons, see
Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous
Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 Tax Law 407, 422–36 (2008).
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story of family or friends, and yet other times I create a hypothetical situation
for the students. Narratives provide students with concrete situations that, in
most cases, real people have confronted as they apply the tax laws to their
lives. Set against the general background of the “neutral” tax rules that we are
studying, these concrete situations make it easier both for the students to see
how differences in treatment play out and for me, as the teacher, to discuss the
policy issues raised by differential treatment based on sexual orientation.
To help others interested in bringing sexual orientation and gender identity
into their tax classes, I have identified several areas likely to be covered in
tax courses in which a discussion of LGBT issues is relevant. This list is not
exhaustive, but provides a starting point for thinking about when and how
one might bring sexual orientation and gender identity into the tax classroom.
At the same time, I would not (and do not) raise LGBT issues in class at
every turn for fear of undercutting the intended impact of these discussions.
Nonetheless, there is a distinct need to integrate at least some discussion of
LGBT issues into the tax classroom. In fact, in one of the LSAC climate
surveys, tax was the non‑LGBT course that the least number of students
identified as addressing LGBT issues.10
The general areas of the tax curriculum that I have identified for inclusion
here are: fringe benefits, health insurance, attribution rules, medical expenses,
property transfers, and income splitting. In each of these areas, I first discuss
the general tax rules that serve as the backdrop for the discussion. Next, I
recount a narrative that—in a concrete, personalized setting—raises the question
of how these general tax rules apply to LGBT individuals. I then explain
how the rules apply to the situation faced by the LGBT individual(s) in the
narrative. Finally, I explore some of the policy considerations that one might
raise (or that might surface on their own) in the course of a class discussion of
the narrative situation.
I. Fringe Benefits
A. Background
Under § 61, gross income includes all income from whatever source
derived, including compensation for the performance of personal services. If
compensation is paid in property or services, then the fair market value of
that property or those services must normally be included in gross income.11
Nevertheless, § 132 contains a series of exceptions to this general rule that
allow employees to exclude certain fringe benefits from their gross income.
Section 132(a)(1) and (2) exclude from an employee’s gross income the value
of any no‑additional‑cost service provided by an employer to the employee
as well as the bargain element of certain employee discounts on property or
services offered by the employer for sale to customers in the ordinary course
10.

Strader et al., supra note 1, at 224 n.36.

11.

Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
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of business.12 This exclusion applies equally to no‑additional‑cost services and
discounts provided to the spouse and dependent children of an employee.13
For this purpose, as is generally the case for federal tax purposes, whether a
different‑sex couple is married—and, therefore, whether an individual qualifies
as the “spouse” of the taxpayer—is determined by reference to state (and not
federal) law.14
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
When teaching § 132, I always use the example of free air travel by airline
employees because it requires students to sift through § 132 and the associated
regulations to find and apply the relevant rules concerning the exclusion for
no‑additional‑cost services. In doing the problems in their textbook,15 students
learn how to jump back and forth within the statute—and between the statute
and the regulations. They also quickly realize that this fringe benefit is tax
free not only to the airline employee, but also to the employee’s spouse and
children and, in contrast to all other no‑additional‑cost services, even when
provided to the employee’s parents.16
Once we have completed the problems assigned in the textbook,17 I tell
my students that my partner is an airline employee. The airline for which he
works offers domestic partner benefits, which makes me eligible for free travel
on that airline (as well as discounted travel on other airlines under reciprocal
agreements). Because this is the first time we encounter the intersection of
sexual orientation and tax in the course, I then tell my students about the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only
to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.18

Thus, even though my partner and I were married in Canada several years
ago, I cannot qualify as his “spouse” for purposes of federal law, including
12.

I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (2), (b), (c) (2008).

13.

Id. § 132(h)(2).

14.

Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (“We agree with the government’s
argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law
rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status.”); cf. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2008)
(providing a federal rule for determining the marital status of same‑sex couples that overrides
any inconsistent state rule).

15.

Joel S. Newman, Federal Income Taxation: Cases, Problems, and Materials 114–15 (3d ed.,
West, St. Paul, MN, 2005).

16.

I.R.C. § 132(h)(3) (2008).

17.

Newman, supra note 15, at 114–15.

18.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2008).
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federal tax law. This means that although my partner’s parents and any
children that we might have will all be able to take advantage of this fringe
benefit on a tax‑free basis, I cannot. In fact, whenever I fly “free,” my partner
sees the income in his next paycheck increased by the value of my flight,19 and
his employer withholds additional taxes from his pay to cover what he owes on
this increase in his income.
Students are sometimes surprised to find that the same holds true for same‑sex
couples who have entered into a valid marriage in, for example, Massachusetts
or Connecticut, because those states recognize same‑sex marriages for state
law purposes, including for purposes of state tax law.20 In this respect, DOMA
departs from the general rule (mentioned above) that the federal tax laws defer
to state law on questions of determining a couple’s marital status. DOMA
singles out certain marriages that are recognized under state law (i.e., those
entered into by same‑sex couples) and denies them recognition for federal tax
purposes.
C. Policy Issues
This differential treatment raises serious equity concerns. In its conventional
sense,21 the tax notion of “horizontal” equity would seem to dictate that two
similarly situated taxpayers with similar income should be taxed similarly.
But, in this situation, my partner is taxed more heavily than his married
heterosexual co‑workers receiving the same fringe benefit. The sole basis for
treating these two taxpayers—who have received the same item of income
from the same employer as compensation for their performance of personal
services—is the sex of the respective taxpayer’s spouse. Under the applicable
rules, a free flight provided to a same‑sex spouse is taxed while a free flight
provided to a different‑sex spouse is tax free.
Interestingly, when my partner’s airline adopted its domestic partner
benefits policy, it probably thought that it was eliminating just this sort of
discrimination. The airline was trying to do the “right” or “fair” thing by
providing all of its employees with equal pay for equal work; however, the
federal government has foiled the airline’s attempt to equalize the treatment
of its employees. Through the tax laws, the federal government has stepped
in to reinstate the discriminatory treatment of the airline’s lesbian and gay
employees that existed prior to the adoption of the domestic partner benefits
19.

The rules for valuing this benefit are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑21(h) (as amended in 1992).

20.

Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Mass. Dep’t Revenue,
Tech. Info. Release 04‑17, at ¶ D(1)(b)(i) (July 7, 2004); see Conn. Dep’t Revenue Servs.,
Connecticut Resident Income Tax Return and Instructions 13 (2007) (indicating that, even
before the advent of same‑sex marriage in Connecticut, same‑sex couples who had entered
into a civil union in Connecticut would generally be treated the same as married couples for
Connecticut tax purposes, even though they were not treated so for federal tax purposes).

21.

For a warning that care should be taken in applying the conventional sense of tax equity to
members of traditionally subordinated groups, see generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity,
55 Buff. L. Rev. 1191 (2008).
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policy. In other words, the federal government has ensured that, by reason
of the application of the tax laws, the airline will still only be able to provide
its lesbian and gay employees with a lesser fringe benefit package than the
airline provides its heterosexual employees. By interfering in this way with an
employer’s ability to equalize the compensation packages of its employees, §
132 also raises serious concerns about the neutrality of the tax laws.
II. Health Insurance
A. Background
The tax treatment of employer‑provided accident or health insurance
coverage is related to the topic of fringe benefits, though it might just as well be
covered separately in connection with a discussion of the exclusion under §§
104 and 105 for amounts received by an employee through accident or health
insurance plans for personal injuries or sickness. Again, as a starting point, §
61 includes in gross income all income from whatever source derived, including
compensation for the performance of personal services. If compensation is
paid in property or services, then the fair market value of that property or
those services must normally be included in gross income.22
Section 106(a) allows an employee to exclude from gross income the
value of “employer‑provided coverage under an accident or health plan.” By
regulation, this exclusion is expanded to encompass the value of coverage
provided to the spouse and dependents of the employee as well.23 Thus, the
value of an employer’s contribution toward accident or health insurance for its
employees, their spouses, and their dependents is free of tax.
To determine the tax treatment of amounts paid out under employer‑provided
accident or health plans, one must turn to §§ 104 and 105. On the one hand, § 105
applies to employees who were able to exclude the value of employer‑provided
accident or health coverage from gross income under § 106. Under § 105(b),
the employee can further exclude from gross income payments made under
the accident or health insurance plan for the medical care of the employee, a
spouse, or a dependent. Section 105(c) additionally permits an employee to
exclude from gross income payments compensating for permanent loss or loss
of use of a part or function of the body or for permanent disfigurement of the
employee, a spouse, or a dependent, so long as the payment is not computed by
reference to the time absent from work. Under § 105(a), payments not falling
within either of the foregoing two categories are includible in gross income.
Section 104, on the other hand, applies to employees who paid for accident
or health coverage with after‑tax dollars. Under § 104(a)(3), to the extent
that an employee (1) directly paid for accident or health coverage and/or (2)
was required to include employer‑paid premiums for such coverage in gross
22.

Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).

23.

Id. § 1.106‑1 (1960); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106‑1, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,421 (Aug. 20, 2007); Notice
2004‑79, 2004‑49 I.R.B. 898.
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income, then a proportionate part of amounts paid out under that coverage
for personal injury or sickness of the employee, a spouse, or a dependent are
excluded from gross income.24
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Many employers, including my own and my partner’s, now offer accident
and health insurance coverage for the domestic partners of their employees.25
We thus have a choice between two different health insurance plans, and it
would seem to make sense for the two of us to opt for whichever plan provides
the best coverage for the least cost. In terms of coverage, both my partner and
I judge my employer’s plan to be the better of the two. But how much would
it cost for my partner to switch to my plan?26
Currently, my partner pays $60 per month (deducted from his salary on a
pretax basis) toward his health insurance coverage while I pay nothing toward
mine. My employer subsidizes the health insurance coverage of domestic
partners to the same extent that it subsidizes the coverage of the spouses of
its married heterosexual employees. If I were to add my partner to my health
insurance coverage, my contribution toward my health insurance coverage
would immediately increase from $0 to $141. This is the same nominal
increase that a married different‑sex couple would experience; however, my
married co‑workers are able to have this amount deducted from their pay on
a pretax basis.27 I cannot.28 If I were able to have this amount deducted from
pay on a pretax basis, I would be able to save nearly $40 in taxes per month
(assuming that my marginal tax rate is twenty‑eight percent). This means that
my married co‑workers with the same marginal tax rate effectively pay only
$101 (after taking into account the tax savings) toward their spouses’ health
insurance, while I would pay the full $141 out of pocket if I were to add my
partner to my coverage. Each year, I would pay a total of $480 more than my
married heterosexual colleagues for the same health insurance coverage. This
is a significant disparity and one that militates against the possibility that my
partner and I would choose to add him to my health insurance coverage.
24.

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.104‑1(d) (as amended in 1970); 1.105‑1(c), (d) (as amended in 1964).

25.

Human Rights Campaign Found., The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual
and Transgender Americans: 2006–2007, at 1 (2007) (indicating that a majority of Fortune
500 companies offer domestic partner benefits).

26.

For purposes of the discussion in the text below, I have omitted payroll taxes from this
calculation because most basic income tax courses do not entail the study of payroll taxes.
To raise this issue, one could mention that the amounts discussed in the text below actually
understate the cost of adding a domestic partner to an employee’s health insurance coverage
because of the need to factor into such cost the payroll taxes that would apply to the
additional compensation income.

27.

Rev. Rul. 2002‑3, 2002‑1 C.B. 316; see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125‑1(a)(2), (3)(B), 72 Fed. Reg.
43,938 (Aug. 6, 2007).

28.

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125‑1(h)(2)–(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938 (Aug. 6, 2007).
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But this possibility grows increasingly remote once we add to the balance
the additional income tax due on my employer’s contribution toward this
coverage. Unless my partner were to qualify as my “dependent,” which he
does not, the excess of the fair market value of his health insurance coverage
over the amount that I paid toward that coverage would be deemed additional
compensation income to me.29 My married heterosexual co‑workers who add
their different‑sex spouses to their health insurance coverage are not taxed on
this amount.30
Assuming that the fair market value of the coverage provided to my partner
over the amount that I contribute toward that coverage is equal to the increase
in my employer’s monthly contribution toward my health insurance coverage,
my income would increase each month by the amount of $411. Again assuming
a marginal tax rate of twenty‑eight percent, I would owe an additional $115
in income tax each month on this amount. That brings the total cost to $256
per month to switch my partner to my health insurance plan—this is two and
one‑half times what it would cost my married heterosexual co‑workers in
the same tax bracket to do the same thing. This creates a radically different
cost‑benefit analysis for two otherwise similarly situated employees. In the end,
we naturally decided that the enhancement in coverage that my (thankfully,
healthy) partner would get from switching to my health insurance plan was
not worth the more than $3,000 per year that it would cost us.
C. Policy Issues
The tax treatment of employer‑provided health insurance coverage raises the
same horizontal equity and neutrality concerns that were mentioned above in
connection with the discussion of the exclusion for no‑additional‑cost services
under § 132. The tax laws draw a sharp distinction between similarly situated
taxpayers receiving the same benefits package from the same employer—based
solely on the sex of the employee’s spouse. This differential tax treatment either
discourages the employee from adding her partner to her health insurance
coverage or requires the employee to forfeit a significant additional amount of
her salary (in comparison to her similarly situated heterosexual colleagues) to
obtain the same fringe benefit.
Especially at a time when health insurance is near the top of the national
agenda, the narrative in the previous section also raises an issue concerning
the erection of senseless barriers to gaining access to the best available health
insurance coverage. In attempting to convince an employer to establish a
domestic partner benefits policy, one of the key selling points is that the cost to
the employer is remarkably low. Indeed, one study found that nearly two‑thirds
29.

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003‑39‑001 (June 13, 2003). It is worth noting that, because the
premiums for this coverage would be taxable to me, amounts paid out under that coverage
for personal injury or sickness of my partner would be excluded from my gross income
under § 104(a)(3). Id.; see also, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008‑46‑011 (Aug. 8, 2008); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008‑41‑013 (July 1, 2008).

30.

See supra note 23.
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of employers experience “a total financial impact of less than 1 percent of
total benefits cost” and that “[r]ates of enrollment have not been particularly
high.”31 The low enrollment is most commonly explained as a result of either
(1) an employee’s fear of discrimination if she “outs” herself by asking to add
her domestic partner to her health insurance coverage or (2) the availability
of health insurance coverage through the domestic partner’s own employer.32
Generally left out of the discussion, however, is the possibility that the tax cost
of the benefits makes adding a partner—especially one with existing coverage
through her own employer—prohibitively expensive, even if that coverage
would provide better health care for the partner. Query whether the rates of
enrollment for domestic partner health insurance coverage would experience
a dramatic increase if the tax treatment of same‑sex and different‑sex couples
were equalized.
The tax treatment of employer‑provided accident and health insurance
further raises concerns about stigmatization. The only way around the added
tax costs described in the previous section is for the lesbian or gay employee’s
partner to qualify as his or her dependent for tax purposes. To meet this
requirement, the employee must provide more than one‑half of the partner’s
support, the two must share the same principal place of abode, and the partner
must be a member of the employee’s household.33 Where both partners work,
it will often be difficult to satisfy the support prong of this test. But, even if
the employee does provide the requisite level of support and can qualify the
partner as a tax dependent, what does this say about their relationship?
When one married different‑sex spouse provides the other with health
insurance coverage through work, the value of that benefit is excluded from
gross income regardless of whether both spouses are employed, regardless
of their individual levels of income, regardless of their relative financial
contributions to maintaining their household, and even regardless of whether
they actually live together. Married different‑sex spouses are treated for this
and other tax purposes as a single economic unit—two individuals working
together (whether inside or outside the home) toward the common goal of
making a life together. In contrast, same‑sex couples who qualify for the same
tax treatment as married different‑sex couples are not treated as co‑venturers in
this joint enterprise, but as a breadwinner and a “dependent.” A different‑sex
spouse who works in the home is not labeled a “dependent” of the spouse who
works in the paid labor market; she is still simply a “spouse” for tax purposes.34
31.

Human Rights Campaign, Domestic Partner Benefits: Cost and Utilization, http://www.
hrc.org/issues/workplace/benefits/4827.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).

32.

Id.

33.

I.R.C. §§ 105(b), (c), 152(a), (d) (2008); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106‑1, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,421
(Aug. 20, 2007); Notice 2004‑79, 2004‑49 I.R.B. 898.

34.

I.R.C. § 152(b)(2) (2008) (“An individual shall not be treated as a dependent of a taxpayer
under subsection (a) if such individual has made a joint return with the individual’s spouse
under section 6013 for the taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which the taxable
year of the taxpayer begins.”); id. § 152(d)(2)(H) (excluding spouses from the definition of
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However, a same‑sex partner engaged in precisely the same work in the home35
is labeled a “dependent” of the partner who works in the paid labor market—
as if the stay‑at‑home partner were contributing nothing at all of value to the
relationship.
Finances are a source of stress in any relationship. The tax laws only
exacerbate that stress when they mark one partner as nothing more than a
financial drag on the other, regardless of the contribution that she makes to the
relationship. Though same‑sex couples in this situation manage to circumvent
the additional tax costs normally associated with domestic partner health
insurance coverage, they still do pay a price—in terms of the stigmatization of
their relationship—in order to obtain a valuable fringe benefit that is readily
available to, and easily accessible by, married different‑sex couples.
III. Attribution Rules
A. Background
It is often said that our tax system is premised on the notion that all taxpayers
are “self‑interested, unaffiliated individuals—the atomistic rationalists of the
classic economic model.”36 When a taxpayer is dealing with strangers, this
assumption might be correct; however, when a taxpayer is dealing with family
members, this assumption is either incorrect or will likely prove incorrect, both
because there is an affiliation between the taxpayer and the family member and
because family ties may overcome self‑interest. Anticipating these possibilities,
Congress has peppered the Internal Revenue Code (Code) with rules that
take account of this probable lack of self‑interested, arm’s length dealing.
For example, when a family member acquires the taxpayer’s debt from an
unrelated creditor, § 108(e)(4) treats the taxpayer as having acquired the debt
herself for purposes of determining whether she has discharge of indebtedness
income. In addition, § 267(a)(1) disallows the deduction for any loss realized
on a sale or exchange of property between family members, and § 1031(f)
strips a previous like‑kind exchange between family members of the benefits
of nonrecognition treatment if one of them disposes of the property received
in the exchange within two years of the exchange. Furthermore, § 302(c)
takes into account the ownership of family members in determining whether
a corporation’s redemption of its stock sufficiently altered the redeeming
shareholder’s interest in the corporation such that it should be treated as more
akin to an arm’s length sale or exchange than a distribution of property from
the corporation to the shareholder.

“qualifying relative”).
35.

Take, for example, my sister, who, as described infra Part VI, was a stay‑at‑home mother for
more than four years so that she could care for her and her partner’s children.

36.

See generally Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1529, 1538 (2008).
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Though many of the adjustments in the Code that take account of family
relationships are—like §§ 108(e)(4), 267(a)(1), 1031(f), and 302(c)—in the nature
of anti‑abuse rules, others are designed to benefit taxpayers. For example, the
special estate tax valuation rule for family farms and real property held by small
businesses in § 2032A applies only if the property passes to a “qualified heir,”
who must be a “member of the decedent’s family.” In addition, a corporation
that exceeds the 100‑shareholder limit on eligibility to make an S election can
nonetheless elect pass‑through tax treatment if attribution rules bring the
corporation within the limit. For this purpose, attribution rules in § 1361(c)(1)(A) treat both husbands and wives and all members of a family as single
shareholders. Furthermore, § 121(b)(2)(A)(i) allows one spouse’s ownership
of property to be attributed to the other for purposes of determining whether
the couple will be allowed one or two $250,000 exclusions from gross income
for gain recognized on the sale of a principal residence.
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
While the legal relationship between husband and wife is always taken
into account in the formulation and application of these attribution rules,37
the legal relationship between two same‑sex partners (whether married, in a
civil union, or in a domestic partnership) never is.38 This means that same‑sex
partners are treated as self‑interested strangers for purposes of all of these rules
that make adjustments to take into account family relationships. To illustrate
the different ways in which these rules apply to same‑sex and different‑sex
couples, I have chosen two of the rules mentioned in the background section
above: From the anti‑abuse category, I will discuss the loss disallowance rule
in § 267(a)(1). From the category of adjustments that benefit taxpayers, I
will discuss the § 121 exclusion for gain recognized on the sale of a principal
residence.
1. Section 267
I own a bit of stock in an insurance company that I inherited from my
father when he passed away some eight years ago. (My father, who was
never wealthy and never owned any other stock, received this stock when the
insurance company from which he had purchased a small life insurance policy
converted from a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company.)
This stock has plummeted in value during the past several months. If I were
to sell these shares to my partner for their current fair market value in cash,
I would realize and recognize a loss.39 I would be able to deduct that loss
for purposes of computing my federal income tax (either against my capital
37.

See id. at 1541 (“Spouses are related parties for purposes of all related‑party rules applicable to
individuals….”).

38.

Id. at 1543 (“gay marriage by itself never invokes any related‑party rules—taxpayer‑favorable
or anti‑abusive”).

39.

I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2008).
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gains or, more likely, up to $3,000 of my ordinary income) because we are not
recognized as “family” for purposes of § 267.40 In the end, I would be able to
reduce my federal income tax burden without really parting with those shares
of stock, which would remain within what I consider to be—notwithstanding
Congress’s protestations to the contrary—my family. A married different‑sex
couple in that same situation would be barred from recognizing this “paper”
loss because they are considered family by § 267.41
2. Section 121
My partner and I each owned a home when we met. After we were together
for a few years, we decided that it made sense for me to sell my home and to move
into my partner’s home. When we first began discussing this consolidation of
our living arrangements, my partner floated the idea of my simply moving in
to his home without changing the title to the property, because a title change
would trigger the payment of several thousand dollars of state and local real
estate transfer taxes. (Though these taxes do not apply to transfers between
spouses, they do apply to transfers between same‑sex partners.)42 As discussed
briefly in Part V below, for tax and nontax reasons, we ultimately decided
against this course of action; however, it is worth exploring here some of the
tax reasons why we rejected this option.
In order to avoid potential gift tax issues from this arrangement, I would
have had to pay monthly rent to my partner, and he would have had to include
those rental payments in his gross income and pay income tax on them.43 More
to the point, however, this arrangement would have required us to forego the
ability to benefit (at least in part)44 from two § 121 exclusions for gain recognized
on the sale of a principal residence. To benefit from the exclusion, § 121 requires
the taxpayer to have owned and used the property as a principal residence for
two years during the five‑year period prior to the sale.45 Even though both of
us would have been living in the house and using it as a principal residence,
my partner—as the sole “owner”—would have been the only one entitled to
the exclusion under § 121 upon a sale of the property. In contrast, a similarly
situated married different‑sex couple filing a joint federal income tax return
40.

Id. §§ 165(c)(2), 267(b), (c)(4), 1211(b).

41.

The married different‑sex couple’s loss is additionally disallowed by § 1041, which is
discussed infra Part V.

42.

72 Pa. Stat. §§ 8101‑D, 8102‑C, ‑C.3(6) (2008).

43.

I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2008); see Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (intrafamily, interest‑free
loan gave rise to a taxable gift in the amount of the foregone interest); 5 Boris I. Bittker &
Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts ¶ 121.3.4 (2d. ed., Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, Boston, 1993) (discussing the application of this case to the rent‑free use
of property).

44.

See infra Part V for a discussion of the impact of my partner’s sale of one‑half of his home to
me on his eligibility for the § 121 exclusion.

45.

I.R.C. § 121(a) (2008).
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would still benefit from two § 121 exclusions because the ownership of one
spouse would be attributed to the other for this purpose.46 Whether a couple
is entitled to one or two § 121 exclusions can be vitally important either in an
inflationary market (e.g., the recent housing bubble) or when the couple lives
in their home for an extended period of time.
C. Policy Issues
Naturally, these examples once again raise horizontal equity concerns.
However, they also highlight the intersection between sexual orientation and
class and raise interesting issues concerning the influence of stereotypes on
our thinking.
Though I have been careful here to discuss how the Code’s attribution
rules provide mixed results for both same‑sex and different‑sex couples, in
the literature, commentators addressing the application of attribution rules to
same‑sex couples seem to focus disproportionately on the ability of same‑sex
couples to use their exclusion from these rules to their financial advantage.47
In other words, commentators focus on the ways in which same‑sex couples
can “abuse” or “manipulate” the tax laws for their own personal gain. When
these issues have arisen in class, I have noticed a similar focus in the thinking
of students.
I wonder why so much attention is paid to the possibility for abuse or
manipulation and so little attention is paid to the possibility that same‑sex
couples are disadvantaged by their exclusion from the many attribution rules
that are designed to benefit taxpayers. Is it because lesbians and gay men
continue to be viewed as outsiders—operating not within, but outside and
against the system? Or is it a relic of our not too distant history of being treated
as criminals, who in one state deserved the possibility of being imprisoned for
life until just a few short years ago?48
46.

Id. § 121(b)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, the gift tax issue raised by the rent‑free use of the property is
likely obviated for the married different‑sex couple by their state law obligation to support
each other. Rev. Rul. 68‑379, 1968‑2 C.B. 414; see, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4321(1) (2008)
(“Married persons are liable for the support of each other according to their respective
abilities to provide support as provided by law.”).

47.

E.g., William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Is Bad Tax Policy, 35 U.
Mem. L. Rev. 399, 436–42 (2005) (discussing how DOMA’s exclusion of same‑sex couples
from the Code’s “unity of interest” provisions is bad tax policy because it allows same‑sex
couples to manipulate the tax system in ways that Congress has deemed inappropriate for
different‑sex couples); Anthony Rickey, Loving Couples, Split Interests: Tax Planning in
the Fight to Recognize Same‑Sex Marriage, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 145 (2008)
(developing a tax shelter that exploits same‑sex couples’ exclusion from relevant attribution
rules); Seto, supra note 36, at 1539 (“Here, I propose…to answer a single question: ‘Should
gay marriage automatically trigger related‑party anti‑abuse rules currently triggered by
heterosexual marriage?’”).

48.

See Idaho Code § 18‑6605 (2008); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down the
remaining state sodomy laws, including Idaho’s, as they apply to consensual sex between
adults).
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I also wonder whether this focus stems from the stereotype of lesbians
and gay men as an affluent group with a great deal of discretionary income
at its disposal.49 Much of the potential for abuse and manipulation of the
Code’s related party rules requires existing wealth or disposable income—
not to mention access to sophisticated (and expensive!) tax planning advice.
Whatever its source, this disproportionate focus on manipulation or abuse
that only a wealthy few can hope to execute successfully does nothing more
than further feed and reinforce the myth of lesbian and gay affluence.50
When these issues are discussed in class, it is important to present a balanced
view of how exclusion from the attribution rules can both benefit and harm
same‑sex couples. If students’ focus begins to gravitate toward same‑sex
couples’ ability to take advantage of this exclusion, it would be worth asking
them to reflect on what is pulling them in this direction. Is their thinking
subtly influenced by stereotypes about lesbians and gay men, and are they
unwittingly feeding and reinforcing those very same stereotypes by allowing
their thinking to be influenced by them?
IV. Medical Expenses
A. Background
Section 213 allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses paid for “medical care,”
provided those expenses have not been compensated for by insurance
or otherwise, but only to the extent that the allowable expenses exceed 7.5
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. For this purpose, “medical
care” is defined in relevant part as an amount paid “for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body.”51 This definition is qualified by an
exception for amounts paid for cosmetic surgery. Thus, “‘medical care’ does
not include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related
to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or
trauma, or disfiguring disease.”52 In this context, “cosmetic surgery” is defined
as “any procedure which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and
does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or
treat illness or disease.”53

49.

See David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, LesBiGay Identity as Commodity, 90 Cal. L. Rev.
223, 230–33 (2002) (discussing the commercial gains of the LGBT community that are fueled
by this perception).

50.

See generally M.V. Lee Badgett, Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians
and Gay Men (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001).

51.

I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2008).

52.

Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).

53.

Id. § 213(d)(9)(B).
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In interpreting the disallowance of deductions for cosmetic surgery, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has indicated that it will allow a deduction for
expenses associated with breast reconstruction surgery following a mastectomy
that was part of a taxpayer’s treatment for cancer.54 The IRS will also allow a
deduction for expenses associated with laser eye surgery to correct a taxpayer’s
myopia, but it will not allow a deduction for expenses associated with teeth
whitening to correct discoloration due to age.55 In addition, the IRS initially
disallowed a deduction for expenses associated with a series of surgeries to
remove a mass of loose skin, which had resulted from an obese taxpayer’s
loss of more than 100 pounds, on the ground that the taxpayer’s doctor
had described the surgery as cosmetic in nature.56 The Tax Court, however,
disagreed with the IRS and allowed the medical expense deduction because
obesity is a recognized disease, the skin mass was a deformity caused by this
disease, and removal of the skin mass was not purely a matter of aesthetics
because the mass was prone to infection and interfered with the taxpayer’s
daily living.57
B. How Does This Rule Apply to Transgender Individuals?
As of this writing, the case of O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner is pending before
the U.S. Tax Court.58 Rhiannon O’Donnabhain was born male, but “had
experienced extreme discomfort with her anatomical sex and felt a deep sense
of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex” since childhood.59 Over
time, these feelings only grew stronger and, to combat them, O’Donnabhain
entered the military, then worked in the male‑dominated field of engineering,
and finally married and had children.60 Yet, the “feelings of conflict with her
body intensified, resulting in regular, severe emotional pain….The emotional
turmoil increased to such an extent that by 1996, Ms. O’Donnabhain felt like
her life was unraveling.”61
After her marriage ended, O’Donnabhain’s therapist diagnosed her
with gender identity disorder, “finding that [she] met the criteria set forth
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM‑IV), and as a transsexual, in accordance with the criteria for
54.

Rev. Rul. 2003‑57, 2003‑1 C.B. 959.

55.

Id.

56.

Al‑Murshidi v. Comm’r, No. 4230‑00S, 2001 WL 1922698 (T.C. Dec. 13, 2001).

57.

Id.

58.

O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 006402‑06 (T.C. filed Apr. 3, 2006).

59.

Petition at 3, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 006402‑06 (T.C. Apr. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/odonnabhain‑tax‑court‑petition.pdf.

60.

Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, In re Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, http://www.
glad.org/work/cases/in‑re‑rhiannon‑odonnabhain/ (last visited May 4, 2009) [hereinafter
GLAD].

61.

Petition, supra note 59, at 4.
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transsexualism in the International Classification of Diseases–10.”62 In both
cases, the standard for treatment required individualized assessment, and the
treatment could range from hormone therapy, to living in the new gender role,
to surgery.63 As part of her treatment, O’Donnabhain began to take feminizing
hormones in 1997; legally changed her name in 2000, announced that change
to her family and co‑workers, and presented as female in her daily life for
at least one year; and then underwent sex reassignment surgery in 2001.64
“Following her sex reassignment surgery, Ms. O’Donnabhain finally has a
sense of comfort with her body. Feelings of conflict and pain have disappeared
as she has succeeded in integrating her physical, mental, and emotional
selves.”65
Given that her sex reassignment surgery was part of the medically indicated
treatment for a diagnosed illness, O’Donnabhain deducted the costs of that
treatment on her tax return under § 213. The costs for the surgery totaled
approximately $25,000.66 O’Donnabhain was then audited. The local IRS
office seemed willing to allow the deduction; however, after seeking advice
from the Chief Counsel’s office, the IRS disallowed the deduction on the
ground that O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery was “cosmetic” within
the meaning of § 213(d)(9).67
Pointing to the legislative history, the Chief Counsel’s office found that
Congress intended to allow a deduction only for medically necessary cosmetic
surgery, such as:
(1) procedures that are medically necessary to promote the proper function of
the body and which only incidentally affect the patient’s appearance; and (2)
procedures for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from a congenital
abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease (such as reconstructive
surgery following the removal of a malignancy).68

The Chief Counsel’s office concluded that “[t]here is nothing to substantiate
that these expenses were incurred to promote the proper function of the
taxpayer’s body and only incidentally affect the taxpayer’s appearance. The
expenses also were not incurred for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising
from a congenital abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease (such as
62.

Id. at 3.

63.

Id. at 4.

64.

Id. at 5–7.

65.

Id. at 7.

66.

GLAD, supra note 60.

67.

I.R.C. Chief Couns. Adv. 2006‑03‑025 (Jan. 20, 2006). Transgender individuals also face the
same battle over whether their gender‑confirmation‑related care is medically necessary or
merely cosmetic when attempting to seek reimbursement under state Medicaid programs.
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 Hastings L.J. 731, 783–88 (2008).

68.

I.R.C. Chief Couns. Adv. 2006‑03‑025 (Jan. 20, 2006).
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reconstructive surgery following the removal of a malignancy).”69 Moreover,
noting controversy surrounding sex reassignment surgery, the Chief Counsel’s
office indicated that “[o]nly an unequivocal expression of Congressional intent
that expenses of this type qualify under section 213 would justify the allowance
of the deduction in this case.”70
C. Policy Issues
The application of § 213(d)(9) to O’Donnabhain’s situation raises
an interesting issue of perspective; namely, from whose perspective is it
determined that a given surgery is purely cosmetic in nature? As a starting
point, it is interesting to note that Congress did not disallow deductions for all
cosmetic surgeries. Instead, Congress chose to draw a line between different
types of cosmetic surgery, making the expenses of some cosmetic surgeries
deductible and disallowing a deduction for others. To be deductible, § 213(d)(9)(A) requires cosmetic surgery to be “necessary to ameliorate a deformity.”
Thus, a deductible procedure is one that corrects a defect in the taxpayer’s
appearance that is visible to others; after all, a procedure that corrects a
nonvisible deformity could hardly be called “cosmetic.”
In other words, a procedure that merely improves upon an appearance that
others do not find misshapen or defective is purely cosmetic and, therefore,
nondeductible; however, a procedure that corrects an appearance that others
do find misshapen or defective is not purely cosmetic and, therefore, is
deductible. As noted above, breast reconstruction surgery, laser eye surgery,
and removal of a mass of skin from a patient with significant weight loss have
all been found to give rise to a medical expense deduction under § 213(d)(9). Interestingly, in each of these cases, the surgery brought the taxpayer’s
body into conformity with general societal expectations of what a “normal”
and “properly functioning” body looks like. That is, the breast reconstruction
surgery restored the breasts that society expects women to have; the laser eye
surgery allowed the taxpayer to go about his day without the encumbrance of
eyeglasses or contact lenses that mark his myopic eyesight as defective; and
the skin removal surgery gave the taxpayer the trimmer body shape that is
considered “normal” in American society. In contrast, the teeth whitening
did nothing more than improve an otherwise acceptable appearance. The
taxpayer’s teeth were not defective; they had merely—and quite naturally—
changed color due to the passage of time. The teeth whitening might have
improved the taxpayer’s self‑image, but it was not necessary to correct what
others perceived to be a defect or deformity.
The IRS has placed O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery in the same
category as teeth whitening. Because others do not perceive O’Donnabhain’s
male body form as misshapen or defective, surgery to change that body into a
female form did nothing more than improve or change an otherwise acceptable
69.

Id.

70.

Id.
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appearance. O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery was not necessary
to correct what others would consider a deformity—quite the contrary, there
are many who would argue that her surgery actually deformed a perfectly
acceptable body.71 Viewed from this perspective, O’Donnabhain’s perception
of a bodily defect (i.e., the disconnect that she experienced between the form
of her body and her gender identity) and the significant psychological distress
that defect has caused her are, quite simply, irrelevant. Indeed, in enacting
§ 213(d)(9), Congress attempted to distinguish between procedures that are
medically (i.e., perceived by others as) necessary and procedures that are
purely cosmetic (i.e., those that “are, in essence, voluntary personal expenses,
which like other personal expenditures (e.g., food and clothing) generally
should not be deductible in computing taxable income”).72
At first glance, this might appear to be nothing more than a necessary
objective/subjective distinction necessitated by administrative concerns in
dealing with expenses that might entail mixed (i.e., medical and personal)
motives.73 Adopting an objective approach to determining whether surgery
is purely cosmetic in nature certainly makes it easier for both taxpayers and
the IRS to decide whether expenses associated with cosmetic surgery are
deductible. Nevertheless, behind this apparently benign objective/subjective
distinction lies a whole array of other, far more problematic binaries. As
applied to O’Donnabhain’s situation, this objective/subjective distinction
masks the privileging of physical health over mental health by allowing a
deduction for cosmetic surgery that addresses a physical issue (i.e., breast
reconstruction for a cancer patient) but not allowing a deduction for the
same surgery when it addresses a mental health issue (i.e., O’Donnabhain’s
diagnosed gender identity disorder). It also masks the privileging of a
majority/hetero perspective over a minority/trans perspective by allowing the
IRS, the courts, and society more generally to judge what a “normal” body
shape is/ought to be for O’Donnabhain rather than allowing her to make that
determination for herself. It additionally masks the privileging of a “natural”
over a constructivist view of gender by equating birth sex with gender identity
and refusing to accept the possibility of a conflict between the two. It further
privileges the wealthy over the poor and working class by denying access to
71.

See, e.g., Margaret Wente, The Explosive Rethinking of Sex Reassignment, The Globe &
Mail (Toronto, Ont., Can.), Aug. 25, 2007, at A19.

72.

136 Cong. Rec. S15711 (Oct. 18, 1990) (containing the Senate report for the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990). One might argue that the surgical expenses were voluntary or
personal because O’Donnabhain was already presenting as female in her daily life before
the surgery. But, under that argument, laser eye surgery is just as voluntary or personal in
nature—and thus should be rendered nondeductible—because the taxpayer could just as well
have affected others’ perception of the functioning of his eyesight by wearing contact lenses.

73.

See, e.g., Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1980) (indicating that, in adjudicating
claims concerning the deductibility of expenses for business clothing, the courts have
adopted an objective test for determining whether clothing is adaptable to ordinary street
usage and noting the administrative benefits of this approach).
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surgery—for those who would choose it—to all but those who can afford to pay
for it out of pocket.
Moreover, even if O’Donnabhain ultimately proves successful in obtaining
a deduction under § 213 for her sex reassignment surgery, that success will
come at the price of bolstering the medicalization/pathologization of gender
identity and the concomitant reification of the rigid, male/female gender binary
that the medical establishment promotes and polices through its treatment of
transgender persons.74
V. Property Transfers
A. Background
Though the federal tax system is generally built around the notion that the
individual is the proper taxable unit,75 there are a number of provisions in the
Code that expand the unit to include a spouse (and, sometimes, dependents).
These provisions treat the married different‑sex couple (or “traditional”
family) as a single economic unit for tax purposes. Most visibly, the treatment
of married different‑sex couples as a single economic unit is evidenced in §§
1041, 2056, and 2523.76
Section 1041 provides that no gain or loss is recognized upon the transfer
of property from one spouse to the other. Sections 2056 and 2523 allow the
taxpayer a deduction for estate and gift tax purposes for transfers made to a
spouse or a surviving spouse. Taken together, these provisions allow for the
transfer of property within the taxable unit (i.e., from one married spouse to
the other) without triggering income, gift, or estate taxes. That is, a transfer of
property will generally not trigger any of these taxes unless the transfer takes
the property outside of the marital/economic unit.
In the case of the income tax, the married different‑sex couple is afforded a
grace period following the dissolution of their relationship during which they
will continue to be treated as a single economic unit despite their estrangement.
Section 1041(a) creates this grace period by not only covering transfers between
spouses, but also transfers between former spouses that are incident to divorce.
For this purpose, a transfer is incident to divorce if it “occurs within 1 year after
the date on which the marriage ceases” or if it “is related to the cessation of the
74.

See generally Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 Berkeley Women’s
L.J. 15 (2003).

75.

See 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 2.3 (“From its inception,…the federal income tax has
been based on the…view that every individual should be permitted to file a personal income
tax return embracing his or her own income but not the income of the taxpayer’s spouse,
children, or other relatives.”).

76.

“The committee believes that a husband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for
purposes of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes. Accordingly,
no tax should be imposed on transfers between a husband and wife.” S. Rep. No. 97‑144, at
127 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228.
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marriage.”77 The former category of transfers (i.e., those occurring within one
year of the cessation of the marriage) actually covers any transfer of property
between the former spouses, regardless of whether it is actually related to the
divorce.78 Transfers occurring after this one‑year period elapses are presumed
to be related to the cessation of the marriage if they are made pursuant to a
divorce or separation instrument and occur within six years of the cessation of
the marriage.79
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Simply put, these rules have absolutely no application to same‑sex couples.
Rather than being treated as a single economic unit, same‑sex couples (and
others in nontraditional family arrangements) are treated as legal strangers
to each other for tax purposes. In the absence of the protection of §§ 1041,
2056, and 2523, a transfer of property from one member of a same‑sex couple
to another will be a taxable event. It will either trigger income tax (in the case
of a sale or other disposition), gift or estate tax (in the case of a gratuitous
transfer), or a combination of income and transfer taxes (in the case of a
part‑sale, part‑gift).
Consider, for example, what occurred when my partner and I consolidated
homes in Pittsburgh. As discussed above, we each owned a home before we
met. Eventually, we decided that it made sense to sell my home and for me
to move into my partner’s home. As part of the move—and to signify that my
partner’s home would no longer be his home, but our home—he conveyed the
property to the two of us as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
If my partner had made this conveyance gratuitously, the transfer of
one‑half of the property to me as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship
would have triggered gift tax.80 The gift tax unified credit would have applied
to this transfer and sheltered us from the actual payment of tax; however, the
transfer would have significantly reduced the amount of property that my
partner could transfer free of gift tax over the remainder of his lifetime without
the payment of tax.81 A similar transfer from a wife to a husband would be
completely protected from gift tax by § 2523.82 As a result, the wife’s gift tax
77.

I.R.C. § 1041(c) (2008).

78.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041‑1T, Q&A‑6 (as amended in 2003).

79.

Id. at Q&A‑7.

80.

Treas. Reg. § 25.2511‑1(e), (h)(5) (as amended in 1997). Pennsylvania permits joint tenants
with right of survivorship to unilaterally sever the tenancy, see, e.g., Vegas v. Brinton, 451 A.2d
687, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), which would mean that one‑half of the value of the property
would have been subject to gift tax.

81.

I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2008). When considered in light of the discussion of income splitting, infra
Part VI, this can be a significant concern even for middle‑income same‑sex couples.

82.

See I.R.C. § 2523(d) (2008) (taking such a transfer out of the exception for terminable
interests).
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unified credit would remain untouched, enlarging the amount that she could
transfer over her lifetime free of gift tax.
Instead, we chose to have my partner sell me a one‑half interest in his home.
Fortunately, the net proceeds of the sale of my prior home were sufficient to
cover the cost of purchasing one‑half of my partner’s home; otherwise, we
would have had to come up with some sort of a financing arrangement.83 By
purchasing a one‑half interest in the home for its fair market value, we were
able to avoid the specter of the gift tax84—but at the price of triggering the
income tax. At the time of the transfer, my partner was required to reckon up
his gain or loss on this sale of a one‑half interest in our home. Though the gain
was significant, he did qualify for relief from income tax under § 121, which
allows an individual to exclude the first $250,000 of gain on the sale of his
principal residence once every two years.85
Again, however, this ability to avoid paying tax now will have repercussions
later. The IRS has taken the position that my partner only gets one $250,000
exclusion under § 121 with respect to our home—no matter how long the interval
between this and any other sale.86 In other words, he gets only one exclusion
even if the sale of our home to a third party takes place more than two years
after my purchase of a one‑half interest in the home. This means that when we
sell the house in the future, he will only be entitled to exclude so much of his
one‑half of the gain as does not exceed the portion of the $250,000 exclusion
that remained to him after I purchased my one‑half interest. A similar sale
from a wife to a husband would have been completely protected from income
tax by § 1041, leaving the wife’s § 121 exclusion untouched and fully available
for use on a later sale of the home to a third party.
If, at some point, my partner and I were to decide to dissolve our marriage,
we would have to be concerned about the potential tax consequences of
dividing our property between us. If we were content with continuing to own
our home (and, say, rent it out to a third party), we could simply sever our joint
tenancy with right of survivorship and own the property as tenants in common.

83.

Either I would have had to obtain a loan from a bank or borrow the money from my partner.
Going to a bank would have meant incurring any fees associated with obtaining a home
loan and paying interest to the bank. By borrowing the money from my partner, I would
have been able to avoid the bank fees, but I would still have had to pay him interest that he
would have had to include in his gross income. Id. § 61(a)(4). In either case, I might have
been able to deduct the interest payments, see id. § 163(h)(3); however, that deduction would
have reduced, but not eliminated, this cost. Moreover, the interest rate on any loan from my
partner would, at least, have had to equal the “applicable federal rate” in order to avoid the
application of § 7872, which looks to the nature of the transaction (and not the relationship
between the parties) and would have subjected my partner to income and gift tax on any
foregone interest.

84.

Cf. id. § 2512(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512‑8 (as amended in 1992).

85.

Treas. Reg. § 1.121‑4(e) (as amended in 2002).

86.

T.D. 9030, 2003‑8 I.R.B. 495, 497–98.
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This severance would not be a taxable event for income tax purposes.87 If,
however, we were not content to remain as co‑owners of the home and one of
us were to buy out the other’s interest, that sale of one‑half of the home would
be a taxable event (subject to the—in my partner’s case, limited—application of
the § 121 exclusion). A divorcing different‑sex couple would be protected from
income tax by § 1041 in this case.
If the two of us were instead to live a happy life together for decades to
come, the existence of the right of survivorship could come back to haunt us
at the time that the first of us passes away. Under § 2040(a), the entire value of
the home would be included in the gross estate of the first to pass away, unless
his executor could demonstrate the extent to which the survivor actually
contributed (out of the survivor’s own funds) to the purchase or improvement
of the property.88 With the passage of decades, the documents that evidence
our respective contributions toward the purchase or improvement of our home
could easily have been lost, destroyed, or disappeared. This would make
carrying the burden of proof difficult, if not impossible—especially given “that
the IRS has never provided any guidelines for what would be an acceptable
level of proof when two partners have owned property jointly for many
years.”89 This could mean that the first of us to pass away would be required to
pay estate tax on property that really belongs to the survivor. In the case of a
married different‑sex couple, § 2040(b) provides simplified rules for property
held by the couple as joint tenants with right of survivorship, because the
existence of § 2056 renders an inclusion in the gross estate all but irrelevant:
The committee believes that the taxation of jointly held property between
spouses is complicated unnecessarily. Often such assets are purchased with
joint funds making it difficult to trace individual contributions. In light of the
unlimited marital deduction…, the taxation of jointly held property between
spouses is only relevant for determining the basis of property to the survivor
(under sec. 1014) and…certain [other] provisions. Accordingly, the committee
believes it appropriate to adopt an easily administered rule under which
each spouse would be considered to own one‑half of jointly held property
regardless of which spouse furnished the consideration for the property.90

C. Policy Issues
Again, with similarly situated taxpayers receiving different tax treatment,
the drumbeat of horizontal equity concerns continues to sound. But this
difference in treatment also raises other interesting policy concerns. At one
level, drawing on typical tax policy goals, this difference raises a question of tax
87.

Rev. Rul. 56‑437, 1956‑2 C.B. 507.

88.

Treas. Reg. § 20.2040‑1(a)(2) (as amended in 1960).

89.

Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 677, 694
(2000).

90.

S. Rep. No. 97‑144, at 127 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228.
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neutrality. Sections 1041, 2056, and 2523 allow married different‑sex couples to
treat tax as a neutral factor in arranging and rearranging both the ownership of
property as between themselves and the form of that ownership (e.g., separate
ownership v. tenancy in common v. joint tenancy with right of survivorship
or tenancy by the entirety). When same‑sex couples wish to undertake such
economic arranging and rearranging between themselves, they will find that
tax is far from a neutral factor—indeed, it can act as a strong impediment to
achieving what the couple views as the most efficient ownership structure for
their property.
At a deeper level, one can see that more insidious issues arise regarding the
integrity of the couple. Taken together, §§ 1041, 2056, and 2523 afford married
different‑sex couples a certain “zone of privacy” because, having made transfers
of property within the couple wholly nontaxable events, Congress has carved
out a space in which different‑sex couples need not worry about the prying
eyes of the government intruding in their private financial dealings.91 After
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,92 same‑sex couples thought
that they had finally banished the prying eyes of the government from their
homes. Not so. The IRS can still knock on the door of a same‑sex couple (or a
grieving surviving same‑sex partner), come in, and probe all of their financial
dealings with one another—because those dealings have tax consequences and
are, therefore, considered a legitimate topic of government inquiry.93
VI. Income Splitting
A. Background
The ability of married different‑sex couples to file a joint federal income tax
return under § 6013 is another example of the treatment of such couples as a
single economic unit. The joint return is designed to allow “a husband and
wife”94 to split their income between them for federal income tax purposes.
In effect, “[j]oint returns subject all married couples with the same amount of
taxable income to the same tax liability, regardless of how their income and
deductions are divided between them.”95 As a result, “married couples…have
no incentive to engage in income‑splitting devices to shift income from one
91.

Naturally, different‑sex couples are subject to estate tax audits; however, outright transfers
of property within the couple will not be an issue in those audits because such transfers are
not subject to tax. Different‑sex couples need only be audited with respect to transfers that
take property outside the couple. In contrast, same‑sex couples are subject to tax and audit
on all transfers, whether the property remains within or is taken outside the couple.

92.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

93.

To get a sense of what this intrusion might look like, see Cain, supra note 89, at 696–97, which
provides a series of short narratives based on stories from lawyers and accountants who have
represented lesbian and gay clients in estate tax audits.

94.

I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2008).

95.

4A Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 111.3.2.1.
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spouse to the other because the joint return itself is an efficient income‑splitting
device.”96 This ability to split income can continue even after the marriage
ends, if one spouse pays the other alimony and the couple elects into the
alimony inclusion–deduction regime established by §§ 71 and 215.
Overall, the ability to split income may be a positive, negative, or neutral
tax aspect of marriage.97 For some couples, the ability to split income provides
a marriage bonus, meaning that they pay less tax as a married couple than they
would if they were unmarried and each filed “single” tax returns. This marriage
bonus is largest for couples in which only one spouse earns income. For other
couples, filing a joint return means paying more tax as a married couple than
they would if they had remained unmarried and each filed a “single” return.
This marriage penalty is largest for couples with equal incomes.98 Yet other
couples find themselves in a situation where filing a joint return produces
neither a marriage penalty nor a marriage bonus.
However flawed and criticized it might be on other grounds,99 the
income‑splitting privilege provided by the joint return contributes to rendering
tax a neutral factor in decisions about whether and to what extent the couple
will pool their finances. In other words, when filing a joint return, the couple
is treated as if they split their income equally between them, regardless of
whether they (1) actually do split their income, (2) only partially split their
income, or (3) keep their finances completely separate.
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Same‑sex couples are, of course, ineligible to file a joint federal income
tax return because they are not “a husband and wife.” Thus, even if they
96.

Id.

97.

See Cong. Budget Office, For Better or for Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax
29–30 (1997) (indicating that, under the basic measure of the marriage penalty/bonus, 21
million couples paid a marriage penalty, 25 million couples received a marriage bonus, and
3 million couples neither paid a marriage penalty nor received a marriage bonus in 1996).

98.

Provisions other than the tax rate schedules also contribute to the marriage penalty. For
example, the marriage penalty is exacerbated whenever a married couple is only afforded
the same tax benefit as a single individual even though each of the spouses could qualify
for that benefit separately. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. § 221 (2008) (providing the same monetary
ceiling for educational interest deductions for single individuals and married couples, who
are compelled to file jointly to obtain this benefit) with id. § 121 (doubling the amount of gain
that can be excluded from gross income on the sale of a principal residence in the case of a
married couple filing a joint return).

99.

See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 787 (1997); Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing
Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 261 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income‑Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
Hastings L.J. 63 (1993).
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are permitted to file a joint return for state income tax purposes, a same‑sex
couple must file two separate “single” returns for federal income tax purposes.
Incidentally, this disparity in treatment increases the reporting burden and
cost of compliance for same‑sex couples in states that legally recognize their
relationships. Because some of these states use the federal income tax return
as a starting point for computing their own taxes, same‑sex couples often find
it necessary to translate their two “single” federal returns into a mock “joint”
federal return before they can then complete their “joint” state tax return.100
Because they cannot be considered married for federal tax purposes, it is
often noted that same‑sex couples can avoid the marriage penalty. This point
is supported by citations to studies such as the 2004 Congressional Budget
Office report estimating that, if the federal government and all fifty states were
to recognize same‑sex marriage, there would be a small, positive impact on
federal tax revenues due, in part, to the operation of the marriage penalty.101
Yet, the individuals making these points seldom recognize that these studies
are based on incomplete information and questionable assumptions. The CBO
study, for example, readily admits the problems associated with: (1) accurately
identifying the number of same‑sex couples in the population; (2) predicting
the number of same‑sex couples who would marry, if permitted to do so; and
(3) reconstructing these couples’ income and assets based on limited data.102
Recalling the discussion above regarding the exemption of same‑sex couples
from the Code’s attribution rules,103 one can only wonder about the extent to
which stereotypes about lesbian and gay men—and particularly the myth of
affluence—wittingly or unwittingly color the assumptions upon which these
studies are based.
Even putting aside the additional burdens imposed on same‑sex couples
when they file their state tax returns and the questionable results of studies
regarding the effect of the marriage penalty on same‑sex couples, those
who argue that same‑sex couples are financially better off by not having the
government recognize their relationships for tax purposes miss the mark in
an important respect. In contrast to married different‑sex couples, same‑sex
100. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Note, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax Implications
of Interstate Recognition of Same‑Sex Marriage, 4 Pitt. Tax Rev. 137, 141, 143, 144, 145–46
(2007).
101. Cong. Budget Office, The Potential Budgetary Impact of Recognizing Same‑Sex Marriages
2, 3 (2004), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06‑21‑SameSexMarriage.pdf.
102. Id.; see also James Alm et al., Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of
Legalizing Same‑Sex Marriage, 53 Nat’l Tax J. 201 (2000).
103. See supra Part III.
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couples must be cognizant of the tax ramifications of pooling their income.
Where the two do not contribute to the pool in exactly equal amounts, the
partner who contributes more to the pool has effectively made a transfer
to the partner who contributes less. Without the income‑splitting privilege
and the exemption from income and gift tax for transfers between spouses
afforded by §§ 1041 and 2523, the couple must determine the character—and
tax consequences—of the amount transferred between them.
To take a concrete example, let’s consider the situation faced by my sister
Elyse and her partner Cindy. Like many same‑sex couples,104 they have
children—in fact, they now have three. Before the birth of their first child, my
sister left her job. For more than 4½ years, Elyse chose to stay at home and care
for their children. During that time, Cindy worked in the paid labor market
to support their family and was the sole earner.105 Had they been able to file a
joint federal income tax return during that time, they would have received a
marriage bonus (i.e., Cindy would have paid less federal income tax than she
did filing her “single” returns during that period). But Cindy and Elyse have
more to worry about than just missing out on the marriage bonus. During
the time that Elyse was not working, Cindy was the only one contributing to
the financial pool. By supporting Elyse, Cindy made a series of transfers to
her that need to be characterized for both income and gift tax purposes to
determine whether Cindy actually owed even more tax.
For income tax purposes, there exists a variety of different potential
characterizations for the transfers between Cindy and Elyse. For example,
Cindy might be treated as having made a gift each time the mortgage and
utility bills were paid, a trip was made to the grocery store, or a withdrawal was
made from the ATM.106 If so, Cindy would continue to pay income tax on her

104. At the time of the 2000 census, approximately 22% of all households headed by male
same‑sex couples in the United States had children living with them and approximately
34% of all households headed by female same‑sex couples in the United States had children
living with them. Tavia Simmons & Martin O’Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Special Reports: Married‑Couple and Unmarried‑Partner Households: 2000, at 9 tbl.4
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr‑5.pdf.
105. Moreover, now that my sister has returned to the paid labor market, the significant differential
in their pay means that the problem described in the text above persists. My sister wished
to find part‑time work, but was unable to do so. The full‑time job Elyse got is in a different
field from the one that she worked in before having children, and it pays far less than the
work that she did before. Indeed, for now, her pay barely covers the cost of childcare and,
therefore, adds little to Cindy and Elyse’s financial pool.
106. Patricia A. Cain, Same‑Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 97,
114–15 (1991).
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wages,107 and Elyse would pay no income tax on those gifts.108 Alternatively,
the pooling might be characterized as a support arrangement.109 In that case,
Cindy would still be subject to income tax on her wages, and Elyse would
pay no income tax on the support payments.110 A more frightening alternative
would require both Cindy and Elyse to pay income tax on the transfer—on
the ground that it constitutes payment for Elyse’s household services or,
more simply, technically constitutes “income” to each of them.111 Yet another
possibility is that the transfer could represent some combination of the above
(e.g., part support, part gift; part support, part income; or part gift, part
income).
Already dizzy from the array of potential income tax characterizations for
these transfers, Cindy and Elyse must consider these same transfers from a gift
tax perspective as well. Those transfers can also be characterized in a variety
of ways for gift tax purposes—each with their own specific tax consequences.
For example, the transfers might be treated as taxable gifts from Cindy to
Elyse.112 Alternatively, the transfers might be treated as payments in exchange
for Elyse’s household services, in which case the transfers will escape gift tax—
but, as described above, trigger income tax.113 Another possibility is that the
transfer might be characterized as a support payment, which would escape
gift tax (just as it escapes income tax).114 Yet another possibility is that the
transfer could represent some combination of the above (e.g., part nontaxable
support payment, part taxable gift or part nontaxable payment for services,
part taxable gift).
You might be inclined to dismiss these gift tax complications on the ground
that the gift and estate taxes are imposed on only a small slice of the taxpaying
population; namely, the wealthiest among us. But if gift tax were imposed
107. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). Registered domestic partners and married
same‑sex couples in California should be eligible for the income‑splitting privilege even in
the absence of being able to file a joint federal income tax return because they are subject to
California’s community property regime. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S 101 (1930). The IRS
has, however, taken the position that same‑sex couples in California are ineligible for income
splitting. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 2006‑08‑38 (Feb. 24, 2006). This position appears to be
driven more by ideology than by sound application of the tax laws, and it has come in for
strong criticism. E.g., Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income
of California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 Tax Notes 561 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
No Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How the IRS Erred, 110 Tax Notes 1221 (2006).
108. I.R.C. § 102 (2008).
109. Cain, supra note 106, at 115–16.
110. 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 10.2.6; Cain, supra note 106, at 116.
111.

Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried
Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1240, 1244–62 (1980); see also Patricia A. Cain, The Income
Tax: Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 471, 476 (1997).

112. Cain, supra note 106, at 125; Wolk, supra note 111, at 1275–81.
113.

Treas. Reg. § 25.2512‑8 (as amended in 1992).

114. Rev. Rul. 68‑379, 1968‑2 C.B. 414.
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on transfers between members of a same‑sex couple—that is, on every rent or
mortgage payment, on every purchase of clothing, and even on purchases of
food—then this transfer tax on the wealthy would effectively become a sales
tax imposed on a broad swath of the lesbian and gay community. As soon as
the total amount of transfers from Cindy to Elyse exceeded the gift tax annual
exclusion ($13,000 in 2009),115 Cindy would begin spending down her unified
credit, which is currently capped at $1 million.116 As a single‑earner with jointly
held property in an area with a high cost of living, Cindy would easily exceed
the annual exclusion and spend down her unified credit each year. Once her
unified credit has been exhausted, which is a distinct possibility over the course
of a long‑term relationship (or even a series of long‑term relationships), Cindy
would begin paying gift tax at the eye‑popping rate of forty‑one percent.117
Thus, for same‑sex couples, gift taxation is a possibility whose importance
should neither be trivialized nor ignored.118
Finally, it is worth noting that, because the income tax and the gift tax
operate independently, the characterization of a single transfer from Cindy to
Elyse need not be consistent across these taxes.119 In other words, just because
a transfer is characterized as a gift for gift tax purposes does not mean that
it must be characterized as a gift for income tax purposes. In practice, this
results in the further multiplication of the potential tax characterizations for
the transfers from Cindy to Elyse. It also opens the door to the possibility of
truly punitive taxation of same‑sex couples. For example, a transfer might be
characterized as income to both Cindy and Elyse for income tax purposes
and as a taxable gift from Cindy to Elyse for gift tax purposes.120 This
would result in a portion of Cindy’s income being subject to triple taxation.
While pondering this terrifying possibility, it is worth recalling that married
different‑sex couples need not worry about any of this, due to the combination
of the income‑splitting privilege and §§ 1041 and 2523.
Faced with a veritable constellation of potential tax characterizations and
high financial stakes, same‑sex couples, such as Cindy and Elyse, who pool
their income and investments must examine all of the possibilities and settle
on the appropriate tax treatment for any transfer between them. Neither
115.

Rev. Proc. 2008‑66, § 3.30, 2008‑45 I.R.B. 1107.

116. I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2008).
117.

Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of Treasury, Instructions for Form 709, at 12 (2008). In the
absence of congressional action, this rate temporarily drops to 35% in 2010 and then returns
to 41% in 2011. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107‑16, §§ 511(d), (f)(3), 901, 115 Stat. 38, 70–71, 150.

118. See Cain, supra note 89, at 696, for a story about the IRS asserting on audit that all transfers
from one (i.e., the wealthier) partner to the other were taxable gifts.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962); Comm’r v. Beck’s Estate, 129 F.2d
243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
120. Cain, supra note 106, at 124–25; Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same‑Sex Couples, 72 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 359, 375 (1995).
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Congress nor the IRS has made this task any easier, as they both have been
conspicuously silent on the question of how the tax laws apply to same‑sex
couples. Yet, despite this lack of guidance, the tax laws attach a presumption
of correctness to whatever tax treatment the IRS deems appropriate (after
the fact and without any advance public notice) and place the burden on
same‑sex couples to prove that their chosen treatment is correct.121 If, on audit,
the couple fails to carry this burden, they may find themselves liable not only
for additional tax but also for interest and penalties (if they cannot show
reasonable cause for the failure).122 The IRS has, in fact, used this procedural
advantage against lesbian and gay taxpayers on audit.123
Even if a couple manages to win the battle with the IRS over an alleged
failure appropriately to characterize the transfer between them, they may
find that the war is far from over. In addition to settling on an appropriate
tax characterization for the transfer, same‑sex couples must comply with
recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are ostensibly designed to
help verify the accuracy of their tax returns. For income tax purposes, each
taxpayer is required to “keep such permanent books of account or records…as
are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or
other matters required to be shown by such person in any return.”124 Likewise,
for gift tax purposes, each taxpayer is required to “keep such permanent books
of account or records as are necessary to establish the amount of his total gifts
…together with the deductions allowable in determining the amount of his
taxable gifts, and the other information required to be shown in a gift tax
return.”125 Furthermore, if a taxpayer makes gifts to a person in excess of the
annual exclusion, she is required to list separately on her gift tax return each
and every gift made during the calendar year to that person, including gifts
that are not taxed because of the annual exclusion.126
In practice, these requirements impose an impossible compliance burden
on same‑sex couples. The tax laws essentially require same‑sex couples to keep
records documenting every penny that they spend, save, or give away. Every
trip to the grocery store, the clothing store, and the bank must be documented
to determine who spent what and on whom. Without these records, the couple
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to counter IRS assertions about the size
or character of the transfer between them. Even couples who avoid pooling
121. Tax Ct. R. 142(a)(1); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The recordkeeping issues described in the text below make it unlikely
that same‑sex couples will benefit from the burden‑shifting provisions in § 7491. See I.R.C.
§ 7491(a)(2)(A) (2008) (limiting burden shifting to taxpayers who have “complied with the
requirements under this title to substantiate any item”).
122. Infanti, supra note 7, at 790–97.
123. See Cain, supra note 89, at 696–97; see also Infanti, supra note 9, at 433–34.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001‑1(a) (as amended in 1990).
125. Id. § 25.6001‑1(a) (as amended in 1977).
126. Id. § 25.6019‑3(a) (as amended in 1994).
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or carefully avoid differing contributions to the pool may be tripped up by
these recordkeeping requirements because, without the appropriate records,
the couple may find it difficult to disprove the existence of an asserted transfer
between them.
Such a crushing (not to mention insulting) recordkeeping and reporting
burden can only breed noncompliance. Whether intentional or unintentional,
this noncompliance may give the IRS an opportunity to increase the amount
of additional tax owed and to impose penalties. Furthermore, there is the
potential for criminal liability for those who either throw up their hands at the
impossibility of the task or who refuse to acquiesce in their own oppression.
Again, married different‑sex couples need not worry about these reporting
requirements because transfers between them are rendered essentially
irrelevant by the combination of the income‑splitting privilege and the
protection afforded by §§ 1041 and 2523.
And just as married different‑sex couples may continue to share income
after the end of their relationship, so may same‑sex couples. Yet, even though
divorcing different‑sex couples are afforded elective access to continued
income splitting for tax purposes through the alimony inclusion–deduction
regime of §§ 71 and 215, same‑sex couples continue to be dogged by the
same uncertainties about the tax treatment of sharing income (along with the
associated reporting and recordkeeping requirements) after their relationship
has ended as they were during their relationship. It is simply unclear how
continued transfers of income from one partner to the other after the end of
their relationship will be characterized and treated for federal income and gift
tax purposes.127
C. Policy Issues
Horizontal equity is again an issue here, but in a different way. Instead of
presenting a stark choice between being subject to current tax or not (e.g., in
the case of fringe benefits or property transfers), the income-splitting privilege
raises interesting questions of visibility versus invisibility. The ability to file
a joint federal income tax return (and the accompanying protections of §§
1041 and 2523) affords married different‑sex couples predictable (though not
always, from their perspective, favorable) tax treatment. Though Congress
has told same‑sex couples that they cannot have access to the set of tax rules
applicable to married different‑sex couples, both Congress and the IRS “have
utterly failed to provide meaningful guidance on how the Code should be
applied to same‑sex couples, sometimes even in the face of direct pleas for
such guidance from conscientious taxpayers.”128

127. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805, 841–42 (2008);
Chase, supra note 120, at 391.
128. Infanti, supra note 9, at 427 (emphasis added).
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This difference in treatment is neither benign nor accidental.129 Through
the application of DOMA to the tax laws, the federal government clearly
attempts to banish same‑sex relationships from sight by creating every
incentive for same‑sex couples to retreat to the invisibility of the closet (i.e., to
file returns and statements with the IRS that do not connect one partner with
the other in any way) in an effort to avoid detection and punishment. This
overt hostility toward same‑sex couples stigmatizes them by branding their
relationships inferior to those of different‑sex couples. In effect, the tax laws at
once embody and perpetuate societal prejudice, discrimination, and hostility
toward lesbians and gay men by giving such activity the imprimatur of the
federal government.
Conversely, echoing the earlier discussion in connection with property
transfers, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements for same‑sex couples
represent not only an onerous burden but also a severe invasion of privacy. As
mentioned above, after Lawrence v. Texas,130 the government can no longer break
into bedrooms to determine with whom and how lesbians and gay men have
sex, but it can still use the tax laws to knock on the front door, come in, and
probe the couple’s every financial move. In contrast, the tax laws effectively
afford married different‑sex couples a privileged zone of privacy (or, if you will,
the privilege of being visibly invisible) by treating them as a single economic
unit—because transfers within the couple generally have no tax consequences,
the government has no need to inquire about them.
VII. Some Parting Thoughts
As happens when broaching any “controversial” issue in the classroom,
bringing sexual orientation and gender identity into the teaching of tax
will sometimes excite the students, sometimes generate lively and respectful
discussions, and at other times just fall flat. Honestly, there is no way to
eliminate the possibility of adverse results, and a few students will invariably
feel disgruntled because they are not receptive to, or comfortable with,
discussing sexual orientation or gender identity under any circumstances. In
the process of trial and error that is teaching, I have learned to avoid being
distracted by a few outliers and to focus instead on my general audience,
which is composed of law students who remain open to perspectives different
from their own and to persuasion based on logical argument.
129.

Far from finding themselves in a presumptively cooperative relationship, lesbian and
gay taxpayers must contend with a federal government that has already declared itself
openly hostile to them. The federal government has enacted legislation that overtly
discriminates against same‑sex couples; has generally refused to provide guidance
on the tax treatment of same‑sex couples in areas left unclear by that legislation; has
provided unsound, ideologically‑motivated guidance when it has spoken; and has
used its tactical advantages to persecute lesbian and gay taxpayers.
Id. at 434–35.

130. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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In keeping with this idea of being attentive to one’s audience, I have
merely provided the raw material here for bringing LGBT issues into the tax
classroom. How a given teacher decides to use this raw material will depend
on a number of factors, including the composition of the student body and
the particular tax course being taught. Thus, even though the discussion
in this essay often draws together material covered in different tax courses
to provide a complete picture of how LGBT individuals experience the tax
laws, it will be necessary in the classroom to adjust the level of detail to suit
the context. For example, the discussion of property transfers above entailed
coverage of the income, gift, and estate tax consequences of such transfers.
In a basic income tax course, one might skip some or all of the estate and
gift tax aspects of property transfers or simplify the discussion greatly so as
not to confuse students unnecessarily and draw their attention away from the
general point of the discussion. In contrast, in an estate and gift tax course,
most (if not all) students will have taken the basic income tax course already,
and a fuller discussion of the interaction between these taxes will not only
be appropriate, but desirable—so that students can begin to see that different
taxes do not operate in isolation, but interact with each other. In this regard, it
is also helpful to weave these discussions into the larger fabric of the course—
using them to make or reinforce general points—instead of treating them as
token discussions.
In addition, depending upon personal preference and the tolerance of
students for a more intimate class setting, the narratives that frame the discussion
of LGBT issues could be told as a story in the classroom, as I generally do, or
they could be written out as a note or a problem for the students to consider
as they complete the assigned reading for class. Moreover, for those who do
not wish to personalize the narratives by drawing upon their own experiences
(or for those tax teachers who are not themselves LGBT), I would encourage
borrowing freely from the narratives in this essay. Personal vulnerability is not
a necessary ingredient for making LGBT issues relevant to students. In the
end, any story that provides a concrete situation that students can understand
and relate to will serve to raise the consciousness of heterosexual students
about the impact of the tax laws on LGBT individuals. At the same time,
telling these stories will improve the climate for LGBT students by affirming
the value of LGBT perspectives on the law and validating the experience that
LGBT students bring to the tax classroom.

